MAJOR COURT DECISIONS
The following is a compendium of major communications law decisions handed down by courts
of the United States from October 1997 through
March 1998.
American Family Life Assurance
Company of Columbus v. FCC
129 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
Issue:
Petition for review of FCC order holding that
American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus' ("AFLAC") refusal to sell time to federal
candidates unless they agreed to a forum selection clause in the agreement governing political
broadcasts violated the Communications Act.
Holding:
Due to the selling of all of AFLAC's interests in
the television stations, the issue before the court is
moot and this mootness warrants vacatur of the
FCC order.
Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies v.
FCC
1997 WL 783993 (D.C. Cir. 1997)

tween Section 272(e) (4) and Section 272(a) (2) of
the 1996 Act. The former, allowing a BOC to provide "any" interLATA services to its affiliate as
long as it meets the nondiscrimination requirement, clearly runs afoul of the latter, which states
that a BOC may only originate in-region interLATA service through a separate affiliate. The
Commission, in recognizing this tension, stated
that Section 272(e) (4) was not intended to undercut Section 272(a) (2), but "merely required nondiscrimination for any interLATA services that a
BOC was otherwise authorized to provide."
In holding this interpretation of the Act reasonable, the court used the two-step Chevron test. In
the first step, the court found that the statute itself was ambiguous, thus giving the agency's interpretation of the statute considerable deference.
In the second step, the court found that the Commission's interpretation of the statute was consistent with the statute's purpose: "preventing the
BOCs from entering the interLATA origination
market except through affiliates until the sunset
of Section 272(a) (2).
C.F. Communications Corporation v. FCC
128 F.3d 735 (U.S. App.D.C. 1997)
Issue:

Issue:
Petitioner seeks review of an FCC order which
construed Section 272(e) (4) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act") as meaning
that a Bell Operating Company ("BOC") may provide any inter-Local Access and Transport Area
("interLATA") services it is otherwise authorized
to provide, so long as it does so on a non-discriminatory basis.
Holding:
Petition denied. The Court held that the Commission's interpretation of the ambiguous statute
was reasonable and consistent with both the statute's legislative history and its purpose.
Discussion:
The issue arose from the tension created be-

Petitioners seek review of FCC
ting local telephone companies
companies or "LECs") to assess
mon Line ("EUCL") charges on
payphone provider.

decision permit(local exchange
End User Coman independent

Holding:
Because the FCC does not sufficiently explain
why the difference between C.F. Communication's ("CFC") "smart" payphones and LECowned "dumb" payphones justifies its decision to
assess EUCL charges on the CFC payphones but
not the LEC ones and because the FCC's interpretation of its rules was clearly erroneous, the court
vacated the FCC's Order which allowed LECs to
assess EUCL charges on an independent
payphone provider, and remanded the proceedings.
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Discussion:
The court found that first, the FCC's determination that CFC was an "end user" and thus subject to the EUCL charge was erroneous due to its
misguided interpretation of the word "premises"
in its categorization of CFC. Second, the Commission's finding that CFC payphones were not public, and therefore not exempt from the EUCL
charge, delineates an improper reliance on the
definition of "public telephone" as set out in the
FCC's own rules and does not provide sufficient
justification for the distinction drawn between
CFC's payphones and LEC-owned payphones.
Third, the Commission erred when it classified
CFC's payphones as semi-public and subject to
EUCL charges merely because they were capable
of some private use due to their connection to
regular subscriber business lines.
Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC
No. 96-3321 (8th Cir., Jan. 22, 1998)
Issue:
Whether the Federal. Communication Commission ("FCC"), by asserting its authority to establish
prices that incumbent local exchange carriers
("LECs") may charge their competitors for access
to the local telephone network facilities, violated
the U.S. Court of Appeals' mandate that state
commissions have the exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate said prices.
Holding:
The FCC violated the Eighth Circuit's mandate
in Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir.
1997); therefore, the court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to refrain from further attempts to apply its vacated pricing policies
regarding interconnection, unbundled access, resale, and transport and termination of local telecommunications traffic.
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Act"). The court explained that it was the state
commissions, and not the FCC, that had the exclusive authority to determine the applicable
rates. Accordingly, the court vacated the TELRICbased pricing rules established by the FCC. One
month later, however, the FCC denied Ameritech's application to provide in-region interLATA
services in Michigan. In an advisory opinion, the
Commission reasserted its authority to establish
the prices for the local competition provisions by
imposing them as conditions for entry by the
BOCs into the in-region, interLATA telecommunications business. In short, the FCC announced
that it would not grant a Section 271 application
unless the rates were based on TELRIC principles.
The FCC justified its action on the grounds
that, if the FCC did not act, the courts would be
left to determine the definition of "cost-based
pricing" under Section 252(d) of the 1996 Act.
Because this could be a lengthy process, the FCC
decided that it necessarily must be the one to interpret the meaning of "cost-based pricing" because it is the agency responsible for determining
whether applicants comply with Section 252(d).
The Eighth Circuit, however, rejected this argument and held that the FCC could apply state's
pricing schemes, which are effective upon issuance, prior to court review. Further, the court
held that expediency is not a sufficient basis for
an agency to disregard a federal court's mandate.
Unless the Supreme Court reverses the Eighth
Circuit or Congress grants the FCC the authority
to regulate intrastate pricing of local competition
provisions, the FCC does not have authority to
mandate TELRIC pricing schemes. Accordingly,
the court granted mandamus to enforce its mandate and ordered the FCC to cease and desist
from attempting to give effect to its interpretation
of the requirements of Section 252(d).
Melcher v. FCC
No. 93-1110 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 6, 1998)

Discussion:

Issue:

In deciding Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, the court
held that the FCC lacked jurisdiction to regulate
pricing of interconnection, unbundled access, resale, and transport and termination of local telecommunication services under Section 252(d) of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996

Whether the FCC may bar local exchange carriers ("LECs"), including rural LECs, from obtaining Local Multi-point Distribution Service
("LMDS") licenses in the same geographic areas
in which they provide telephone service for three
years from the initial LMDS auction.
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Holding:

SBC Communications v. FCC
1997 WL 800662 (N.D. Tex. 1997)

The FCC may bar all LECs from obtaining
LMDS licenses in jurisdictions where they provide
telephone service for three years from the date of
the initial LMDS licensing auction.
Discussion:
LMDS is "a new wireless mode of communication that supports video, voice, and data services."
In order to foster a competitive environment for
LMDS, the FCC decided that LECs should be
banned from obtaining LMDS licenses in jurisdictions where they provide telephone service for the
first three years from the new licensing.
The LECs maintain that the FCC's decision is
arbitrary and should be set aside by the court.
The court concluded that the FCC adequately articulated that it based the decision on balancing
the detriment to the LECs against the benefit of
creating a competitive market. The LECs also
challenge the validity of the FCC's decision based
on the lack of facts to demonstrate that the three
year bar will achieve the FCC's desired effect. Future events are, by definition, impossible to predict and the court must defer to the FCC.
The rural LECs attempted gain an exemption
from the ban by distinguishing themselves from
other LECs. Specifically, the rural LECs argued
that the restriction violates 47 U.S.C. 309(j) (3)(4) ("Section 309(j)"). The court concluded that
prohibiting a rural LEC from ever obtaining a
LMDS license would violate Section 309(j), but, in
the case at hand, the FCC merely imposed a three
year restriction designed to promote competition.
Neither the plain language nor the intent of Section 309(j) should be construed to forbid the FCC
from placing any restrictions on rural LECs. The
court also dismissed the rural LECs contention
that the FCCs' decision was arbitrary for the same
reasons it denied this argument with respect to
other LECs discussed above.
Finally, several parties seek review of the FCC's
decision to deny waivers from the rules that "governed the use of the spectrum now designated for
LMDS." The FCC believes that these waivers were
sought as "a means of getting the 28 GHz band
reassigned." The court decided that the FCC's decision to deny the waivers was "highly sound."

Issue:
Whether provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 ("1996 Act") imposing restrictions on
Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs") constitute
punishment and thus an unconstitutional bill of
attainder.
Holding:
The court held that the provisions constituted
punishment and thus constituted an unconstitutional bill of attainder.
Discussion:
The challenged provisions are found in Sections 271-275 of the Act, which apply solely to Bell
Operating Companies ("BOCs"). Section 271 restricts the entry of a BOC into the long distance
market, and as long as the BOCs are restricted
under Section 271, they also are prohibited under
Section 273 from manufacturing and providing
telecommunications equipment. Section 272 requires the BOCs to establish a separate affiliate
for particular lines of business, and Section 274
prohibits the BOCs from engaging in electronic
publishing through use of its basic telephone service for a period of four years. Additionally, Section 275 forbids the BOCs from engaging in
alarm monitoring services for a period of five
years from February 8, 1996.
The first argument addressed by the court was
that these provisions constitute a bill of attainder.
The court notes that a statute is considered an unconstitutional bill of attainder when it "(1) identifies a specific individual or group (2) inflicts punishment on that individual or group (3) without
the benefit of a judicial trial." Here the issue that
arises out of these requirements, is whether Sections 271-275 constitute punishment or are
merely economic regulation.
Under all three tests proffered by the court:
(1) the historical test, involving a comparison of
the punishment at hand to the type of sanctions
historically found to constitute legislative punishment; (2) the finctional test, which analyzes

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

whether the challenged law viewed in terms of the
type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably
can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes; (3) and the motivational test, inquiring
into the legislative record and whether it demonstrates a congressional intent to punishment, the
court found evidence of intent to punish the
BOCs for their former parent AT&T's "transgressions" in the past or for crimes it is presumed the
BOCs will commit in the future.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC
No. 97-3446 (8th Cir. 1998)
Issues:
(1) Whether the FCC has the authority to order
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. ("Southwestern") to refund certain service charges paid by
Western Union and whether the Court has the authority to review the FCC's actions; (2) whether
the FCC abused its discretion by ordering Southwestern to refund service charges paid by Western
Union to cover voice-grade performance investment ("VGP") and facilities interface equipment
("FACIF") costs; and (3) whether the FCC acted
in an arbitrary or capricious manner by ordering
Southwestern to refund service charges paid by
Western Union to cover costs associated with supplying station apparatus and large private branch
exchange equipment for two wire metallic and
voice-grade services, and for the central office
equipment used to provide two-wire metallic service.
Holding:
The FCC acted within its authority when ordering Southwestern to refund certain service
charges paid by Western Union, and this Court
has the authority to review the FCC's actions. The
FCC did not abuse its discretion by ordering
Southwestern to refund service charges paid by
Western Union to cover VGP and FACIF costs.
The FCC did not act in an arbitrary or capricious
manner by ordering Southwestern to refund service charges paid by Western Union to cover costs
associated with supplying station apparatus and
large private branch exchange equipment for twowire metallic and voice-grade services, and for the
central office equipment used to provide two-wire
metallic service.
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Discussion:
In 1988, a DC Circuit court determined that the
FCC had "failed to adequately explain" its decision to reject Western Union's contention that
Southwestern had improperly allocated many service charges to Western Union and remanded the
matter to the FCC for further consideration.
Upon reconsideration, the FCC determined that
Southwestern failed to justify the allocation of
these expenses to Western Union and ordered
Southwestern to pay a refund. Southwestern petitioned this court for review of the FCC's actions.
Southwestern maintains that, in ordering
Southwestern to refund the money, the FCC violated two procedural provisions of 47 U.S.C.
§204(a). First, Southwestern argues that Section
204(a) (2) (A) imposes a 5 month time limitation
of the FCC's ability to suspend a tariff. Although
the FCC did not issue its final ruling until 12 years
after the tariff was imposed, the Court concluded
that the statute was not meant to act as a statute of
limitations on the FCC. Second, Southwestern argues that Section 204(a) (1) requires the FCC to
suspend a tariff before it may require a refund.
The Court decided that the purpose of this Section was to limit the costs that might be incurred
if a tariff (which would ultimately be struck down)
were allowed to continue until the FCC issued its
final ruling. The suspension provision in Section
204(a) (1) is not mandatory.
The FCC challenges the authority of this Court
to review its decision regarding Southwestern as
the decision may still be reviewed by the FCC
upon the application of Southwestern. The FCC
maintains that all administrative remedies must
be exhausted before a court may review the FCC~s
decision. The Court concluded, however, that a
court may review a non-final decision if an unreasonable time delay would render the administrative remedy inadequate.
In a Section 204(a) investigation, the carrier
bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of
its charges. The FCC ordered the refunds because Southwestern failed to meet this burden.
Specifically, the FCC determined that Southwestern failed to prove that it reasonably allocated to
Western Union the costs for VGP and FACIF, the
costs for supplying station apparatus and large private branch exchange equipment for two wire metallic and voice-grade services, and the costs for
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the central office equipment used to provide twowire metallic service. The FCC also noted that
Southwestern could still collect the charges if the
merely presented concrete data to support the allocation of the charges.
A court may only overrule a FCC determination
if it concludes that the FCC's action was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law." In making
its decision, the FCC reviewed all data submitted
by Southwestern. The FCC found that Southwestern failed to meet its burden and ordered the refund. ,The Court concluded that the FCC did not
abuse its discretion and its order was "far from being arbitrary and capricious."
United States v. Microsoft
980 F.Supp. 537 (D.C. 1997)
Issue:
Whether Microsoft was in civil contempt of an
antitrust consent decree based on its requirement
that~the original equipment manufacturers
(."OEMS") of personal computers ("PCs") include
Microsoft's Internet Explorer ("IE") with the latestversion of its operating system, Windows 95.
Holding:
The court cannot hold by clear and convincing
evidence that Microsoft violated a clear and unambiguous prohibition found in the consent decree.
Discussion:
The %parties had a consent decree in place
whichi resolved a complaint by the government
against Microsoft for an unlawful monopoly and
restraint of trade in the market for PC operating
system software. The, government now contends

that Microsoft has violated a provision of this
agreement which prohibits Microsoft from "requiring original equipment manufacturers
("OEMs") of PCs to commit to licensing other
Microsoft products in order to obtain licenses to
install Microsoft's PC operating system products."
The government charges that Microsoft coerces
OEMs to license and distribute its Internet Explorer ("IE") by including in its licensing agreement with the OEMs a requirement that, in order
to acquire the right to Windows 95, they must accept this IE, which is a web browser giving PC
users access to the Internet. The government labels this a "tying" arrangement, by which
Microsoft exploits its monopoly on the market
and also violates the terms of the consent decree.
The court found that first, Microsoft would not
be held in civil contempt in light of the demonstrated ambiguity of a provision of the consent decree which expressly allowed it to develop integrated products. Second, the court would impose
a preliminary injunction to prevent Microsoft
from conditioning license agreements for operating a system on agreements to license and distribute Internet browser pending a trial on the
merits of the claim in which, to prevail, the government must show that Microsoft has conditioned its Windows 95 licensing agreements upon
OEM's commitment to license an "other product," namely the Internet Explorer. Finally, the
court would not strike non-disclosure agreements
("NDAs") in a developer's license agreements and
other contracts despite the government's claim
that NDAs would impede the court's ability to enforce an antitrust consent decree because there is
no evidence that NDAs are meant for any purpose
besides requiring that Microsoft be given notice
and an opportunity to object before confidential
information, valuable to commercial adversaries,
is disclosed.

